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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
the concept of due process in the trial of criminal actions. In the instant
case, the effects of the changes are relatively minor insofar as they apply
to subsequent trials. In regard to criminal trials already terminated, the
effects of the changes are much greater. Through lapse of time, the task
of reproving the voluntariness of a confession can become difficult. It is
the type of task many state courts must face as the concept of due process
continues to expand.
Patrick Agnew
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-RIGHT OF A PUTATIVE
FATHER TO VISIT HIS ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
Joseph Stanley was born illegitimate to Mildred Stanley on March 24,
1963. In March of 1964, Mildred brought a charge of fornication and
bastardy against the putative father, Walter Golembewski. Walter ac-
knowledged that he was the child's father, and he was ordered to pay
weekly support for the child. The mother thereafter informed the putative
father that he could no longer visit the child. Subsequently, the father
brought proceedings demanding visitation privileges. The court found
that both the mother and putative father were fit persons, that the mother
was to retain custody, and that the putative father was to be granted visita-
tion privileges. On appeal, the lower court's decision was reversed, the
court stating "as a matter of legal policy it is detrimental to the welfare of
an illegitimate child in the mother's custody to award visitation privileges
to the putative father."1 Commonwealth ex rel. Golembewski v. Stanley,
205 Pa. Super. 101, 208 A.2d 49 (1965).
The controversial point presented for review is whether a putative fa-
ther who is a fit person should be allowed to visit his illegitimate child,
or must any relation whatsoever between the two be cut off.
Early common law considered an illegitimate quasi nullius filius.2 How-
ever, a trend toward liberalization of the common law concept has resulted
in the illegitimate being brought closer and closer to the status of legiti-
macy. These changes have occurred in three areas: inheritance, in which
I Commonwealth ex rel. Golembewski v. Stanley, 205 Pa. Super. 101, _-, 208 A.2d
49, 50 (1965).
2 The doctrine of quasi nullius filius or filius populi made an illegitimate a child of the
people and not a child of any specific parent. In re Gibson, 154 Mass. 378, 28 N.E. 296
(1891), (has subsequently been changed by statute); In re Shriver's Estate, 159 Pa.
Super. 314, 48 A.2d 52 (1946). Practically speaking, the illegitimate child had a parish
which had the same relationship with the child as natural parents have with a legitimate
child. See Horner v. Horner, 161 Eng. Rep. 573 (1799). For a discussion of the medieval
common law rules concerning illegitimacy, see Adams, Nullius Filius, 6 U. TORONTO
L.J. 361 (1945).
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an illegitimate is presently allowed to inherit from, and devise to, at least
his maternal line;3 adoption, in which the mother's consent to the adoption
is a minimal requirement to the validity of such adoption;4 and the custody
of an illegitimate child, which is the focal point of this note.
Since an illegitimate was nullius filius at common law, neither the mother
nor father had any custody privileges. 5 This harsh rule was modified to
place exclusive custody privileges in the mother, leaving the putative fa-
ther without any relationship to the child.6 The prevailing view today is
that the mother of an illegitimate has the primary right to custody, the
putative father having a secondary right over everyone except the mother.7
However, there are a minority of jurisdictions that vary from this rule
and do not allow any rights of custody to the putative father.8
The rule giving the mother the primary right to custody can be easily
understood, but when compounded with various other secondary prob-
lems, a mass of very detailed rules can evolve, the two largest problems
being the "welfare of the child" rule and "visitation privileges" rule. The
most involved intricacies arise when the mother is given the primary right
to custody and that right is integrated with the "welfare of the child" rule;
that is, in custody cases the best interest of the child governs who shall
be awarded custody.9 Protecting the welfare of the child has been applied
3 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, S 1.7(a) (1947); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, S 12 (1963); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 190, § 5 (1955). For a general discussion on inheritance from illegitimates,
see Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 759 (1956).
4 Ex parte Barents, 99 Cal. App. 2d 748, 222 P.2d 488 (1950); Oeth v. Erwin, 6 Ill.
App. 2d 18, 126 N.E.2d 526 (1955); Kalika v. Munro, 323 Mass. 542, 83 N.E.2d 172
(1948). For a general discussion of the consent necessary for the adoption of an ille-
gitimate, see Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 497 (1957).
5 See supra note 1.
6 Regina v. Brighton, 121 Eng. Rep. 782 (Q.B. 1861).
7E.g., Potes' Appeal, 106 Pa. 574 (1884); Re Anonymous, 12 Misc. 2d 211, 172
N.Y.S.2d 186 (1958); In re Brennan, 134 N.W.2d 126 (Minn. 1965); People v. Meredith,
272 App. Div. 79, 69 N.Y.S.2d 462, aff'd, 297 N.Y. 692, 77 N.E.2d 8 (1947); Strong v.
Owens, 91 Cal. App. 2d 336, 205 P.2d 48 (1949). For a general discussion of the rule,
see Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 882 (1954) (the putative father's rights); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d
417 (1964) (the mother's rights).
8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106J, § 62 (1963); Clements v. Banks, 159 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1964).
9 E.g., In re Brennan, supra note 7; Albee Appeal, 189 Pa. Super. 370, 150 A.2d 563
(1959); Corsi v. New Jersey State Board, 96 N.J. Eq. 254, 124 Atl. 609 (1924); Danford
v. Dupree, 272 Ala. 517, 132 So.2d 734 (1961); Re Newell's Guardianship, 187 Cal. App.
2d 425, 10 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1960); Davis v. Hadox, 145 W. Va. 233, 114 S.E.2d 468 (1960);
Bennet v. Anderson, 129 W. Va. 671, 41 S.E.2d 241 (1946); Doering v. Doering, 267
Wis. 12, 64 N.W.2d 240 (1954). In all these cases, the court, when faced with the prob-
lem of who shall be awarded custody, either directly or indirectly based their decision
on what would be best for the child. For cases holding the same in jurisdictions
not cited above, see Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 421 (1964).
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to legitimate, as well as illegitimate children. 10 The strength of this rule
in determining custody is overwhelming.1
In the case at hand, the question is not complete custody, but rather,
visitation privileges. The rules pertaining to custody may also apply to
visitation privileges, since visitation is a form of limited custody.12 Thus,
if the rule that the mother has the primary right to custody 13 would be
applied rigidly, the putative father would be entirely excluded from any
custody privilege including visitation.
The courts have employed numerous approaches in allowing or not
allowing visitation privileges to a putative father. Such reasoning as the
child was legitimized 14 or the child was acknowledged by the putative fath-
er", has been the basis for allowing visitation privileges. The argument that
support is being paid by the putative father, and that therefore he should
be entitled to visit the child, has also been presented, but has met with little
success. 16 It is clear that the rationale the courts proceed upon is "what is
best for the child." At times, the courts will state directly that they are
basing their decision on the illegitimate's welfare.' 7 In Baker v. Baker,",
the court stated
I think it is much better for the child to have the father visit it at stated times,
not only to learn of its continued welfare, but to infuse into it at an early age
the natural love and affection that it should have for a parent who is inter-
ested in its well being.19
10 Commonwealth ex rel. Human v. Hyman, 164 Pa. Super. 64, 63 A.2d 447 (1949);
Baker v. Baker, 81 N.J. Eq. 135, 85 Atl. 816 (1913); Doering v. Doering, supra note 8;
Strong v. Owens, 91 Cal. App. 2d 336, 205 P.2d 48 (1949).
11 This premise will be explored more fully below.
12 People v. Ivanova, 14 App. Div. 2d 317, 221 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1961).
13 See supra note 6.
14 See Bagwell v. Powell, 267 Ala. 19, 99 So. 2d 195 (1957).
15 See Ex parte Hendrix, 186 Okla. 712, 100 P.2d 444 (1940).
16 See Commonwealth v. Spano, 68 Pa. D.&C. 248 (Ct. Common Pleas 1949); Santa
Clara County v. Hughes, 43 Misc. 2d 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1964).
17 In re Anonymous, 12 Misc. 2d 211, 172 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1958), where emphasis
was placed on whether visitation by the putative father would be detrimental to the
child; Mahoff v. Matsoui, 139 Misc. 2d, 247 N.Y.S. 112 (1931) where divided custody
was allowed, during the week for the mother and weekends for the putative father
(the court felt that this was the best procedure to insure the welfare of the child).
In Commonwealth v. Spano, supra note 14, the court disallowed visitation privileges
to the putative father, feeling such was best for the child since he might be confused
by seeing that the father of his half-brothers and sisters was not his father, and that
this would tend to disturb the home of the child as a whole.
Is 81 N.J. Eq 135, 85 At. 816 (1913). This case can be distinguished in that the
mother and putative father had married, the child having been born out of wedlock.
The court, however, treated the child as illegitimate and based its reasoning on the
child's illegitimacy.
19 Id. at 138,85 At. at 817.
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It is for these reasons that both the United States and English higher
courts are reluctant to differ with a trial court's decision in custody cases,
whether the child be legitimate or illegitimate, 20 because the appellate
courts feel that the trial courts have a closer relationship with the parties
involved and are more competent to determine the issue of custody and
welfare of the child.21 Although courts may use many different approaches
in determining whether visitation privileges should be allowed, as seen
above, thorough analysis reveals that courts tend to base their decisions
on the child's welfare.
Hence, the elements used in determining what is best for the illegitimate
are primary problems facing the courts in cases involving custody of
illegitimate children. Primary factors that must be considered are the
child's age, the environment he will live in, and the capabilities of the
mother and the putative father as parents. Specific factors that could be
detrimental may also be evaluated: will the visits upset the home of the
child due to possible emotional conflicts between the parents; does the
illegitimate child have half-brothers and sisters who have a different father
(causing the child to have a confused state of mind); what will other
people in the community (especially immediate neighbors) feel about the
situation, since these feelings can be projected to the child; if the child is
adopted by the husband of a subsequent marriage, will the putative father's
occasional appearance disturb the adoption. There are also beneficial fac-
tors that must be considered: the putative father can ascertain if the child
is being cared for properly, once the child's welfare is removed from the
court's responsibility; the father's love and affection is necessary in a
child's upbringing; if the child knows his natural father from an early age,
he might be able to bear more easily the ignominy of his origin at a more
mature age.
The aforementioned considerations are offered as a small sampling of
the many sociological problems that a court may consider when con-
fronted with a case of this nature. In the instant case, the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania stated
[it is our view, however, as a matter of legal policy, that it is detrimental to
the welfare of an illegitimate child in the mother's custody to award visitation
privileges to the putative father.22
The trial court is allowed no discretion in deciding whether visitation
privileges should be granted to the putative father. With this decision,
20 Strong v. Owens, 91 Cal. App. 2d 336, 205 P.2d 48 (1949) (the lower court must
manifestly abuse its discretion in order to overrule); Guinn v. Watson, 210 La. 265,
26 So. 2d. 740 (1946) (latitude must be given to the findings of the lower court).
See also Veach v. Veach, 122 Mont. 47, 195 P.2d 697 (1948).
21 Supra note 17.
22 Supra note 1 at -- , 208 A.2d at 50 (emphasis added).
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Pennsylvania now finds itself in a very anomalous position, in that if the
mother of an illegitimate child is considered a fit person for custody, the
putative father cannot visit the child. If the possibility exists that the
welfare of the child might be enhanced by granting the putative father
visitation privileges, that possibility is now relegated to a minor status.
This is certainly not within the trend of decisions that other courts have
followed 23 but rather is a minority position.
Majority jurisdictions, when faced with this issue, will tend to take the
view that a great deal of thought should be given to the trial court's dis-
cretion as to the disposition of visitation privileges by the putative father,
in that only there can it be detected whether this illegitimate child would
be benefited or harmed by such visitation privileges.
Lawrence Gabriele
23 See supra notes 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, and 18.
REAL PROPERTY-TAXATION-LEASE OF EXEMPT
PROPERTY TO PRIVATE PARTIES
The Illinois State Toll Highway Commission leased to Standard Oil
Company certain sites along the toll road for use as restaurants and gaso-
line stations. The county where the property is located assessed a tax on
the Standard Oil leaseholds, on the basis of Section 26 of the Illinois Reve-
nue Act' which provides that when tax exempt real estate is leased to one
not entitled to an exemption, the leasehold estate and the property attached
to it are considered to be real estate of the lessee. 2 The Highway Commission
commenced an action to enjoin the assessment, arguing that since the lease
provided for a reduction in the rent by such a tax, the burden of the
assessment would fall upon the Commission which is a tax-exempt body.
3
The trial court accepted the Commission's argument, and entered a decree
enjoining the assessment. The county appealed urging that there are many
decisions holding that land which is leased to private parties by tax exempt
entities is taxable under Section 26, and that in the light of such decisions,
the legislature showed an intention to assess such property by not amend-
ing Section 26 specifically to exempt such leaseholds. The Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the decree of the trial court on the basis that the legislature
intended Section 18 of the Toll Highway Act,4 which exempts all prop-
Ill. Revenue Act § 26, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 507 (1963).
2 Ibid.
3 Toll Highways Act § 18, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121, § 314 (1963).
4 Ibid.
